Rish v. Home Depot Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43677 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-25-2016
Rish v. Home Depot Respondent's Brief Dckt.
43677
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Rish v. Home Depot Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43677" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6125.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6125
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHANNEL (BLACKER) RISH, 
Claimant/ Appellant; 
V. 
THE HOME DEPOT, INC., Employer, and 
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF THE STATE 













RESPONDENTS' (EMPLOYER/SURETY) BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ENTERED BY THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ON THE 23RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2015 
Chairman RD Maynard, Presiding 
W. Scott Wigle, ISB #2802 
Bowen & Bailey, LLP 
1311 W. Jefferson St. 
PO Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety) 
Paul T. Curtis, ISB #6042 
Curtis & Porter, PA 
598 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Attorneys for Appellant (Claimant) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHANNEL (BLACKER) RISH, ) 
) 




THE HOME DEPOT, INC., Employer, and ) 
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF THE STATE ) 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
RESPONDENTS' (EMPLOYER/SURETY) BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ENTERED BY THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ON THE 23RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2015 
W. Scott Wigle, ISB #2802 
Bowen & Bailey, LLP 
1311 W. Jefferson St. 
PO Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Chairman RD Maynard, Presiding 
Paul T. Curtis, ISB #6042 
Curtis & Porter, PA 
598 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety) Attorneys for Appellant (Claimant) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................... i 
Table of Cases and Authority ......................................................................... ii 
I. Statement of the Case ........................................................................ 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................................... 1 
B. Course of Proceedings .............................................................. 2 
C. Statement of Facts ................................................................... 3 
IL Argument. ...................................................................................... 12 
A. The Standard ofReview ............................................................. 12 
B. Some Perspective on Claimant's Condition and Her Claim ................... 14 
C. The Commission Did Not Misinterpret Chavez v. Stokes ..................... .. 16 
D. The Commission's Finding on Medical Treatment is Supported by 
Substantial and Competent Evident ................................................ 19 
E. The Argument Regarding Dr. Burks is a Red Herring .......................... 24 
III. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 26 
IV. Certificate of Service ......................................................................... 27 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Chavez v. Stokes,_ Idaho_, 353 P.3d 414 (2015) ............................... 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 737, 40 P.3d 91, 95 (2002) .................... 13 
Edmondson v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 108,937 P.2d 420 (1997) .... 16 
Evanston Hospital v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540,543 (7th Cir. 1993) ......................................... 16 
Fife v. The Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 513, 260 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2011) ................ 12 
Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597,601,273 P.3d 569,573 (2012) ......................... 13 
Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103 ......................................................... 14 
Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993) .................... 17 
Knowltonv. Wood River Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 135, 140,254P.2d36,41 (2011) .................. 12 
Lizer v. Eagle Air Med Corp., 308 F.Supp2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2004) ................................. )6 
Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001) .......................................... 14 
McAlpin v. Wood River Med. Ctr., 129 Idaho 1, 3,921 P.2d 178, 180 (1996) ..................... .12 
McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584-5, 272 P.3d 554, 556-57 (2012) .............. .12 
Neel v. Western Construction Inc. 14 7 Idaho 146, 206 P .3d 852 (2009) ............................. 16 
Rybicki v. Hartley, 792 F.2d 260,261 (1st Cir. 1986) .................................................. 16 
Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989) ............... 17, 18 
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Idaho 133, 136, 666 P.2d 1144, 
1147 (1983) .......................................................................................... 12 
Walters v. All Phase Const., 156 Idaho 259,332 P.3d 992 (2014) ................................ 13, 14 
11 
v. Williams 157 Idaho 1263 (2014) ... 
Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999) ..................... .12 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (25) (c) .............................................................................. 16 
42 C.F.R. § 447.15 .......................................................................................... .16 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, American's Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and 
Prescription Drug Abuse, presented by Nora D. Volkow, M.D., May 14, 2014 .......... .14 
lll 
I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission in a workers' 
compensation case. Claimant Channel Rish ("Claimant") twisted her right knee while working 
as a cashier for The Home Depot ("Employer"). The Employer and its workers' compensation 
surety, Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania ("Surety'), accepted Claimant's claim and 
paid appropriate medical and time loss benefits while she recovered from her injury. When she 
was rated for permanent physical impairment by her treating orthopedic surgeon, Employer and 
Surety paid the appropriate permanent physical impairment benefits. 
Even after Claimant had reached medical stability, the Defendants continued to pay for 
additional medical care to address her continuing pain complaints. This treatment principally 
involved the receipt of narcotic pain medications prescribed by a "pain management" physician. 
After a number of months, when it became clear that the treatment was not providing any benefit 
to Claimant, the Defendants (with medical support) ceased paying for additional treatment. 
Thereafter, for a period of several months Claimant was narcotic-free. She then relapsed and got 
back on opioid pain medications. For the past few years she's been getting her drugs from 
another pain management physician who is reimbursed by Medicaid. 
In this workers' compensation case Claimant alleged that the Defendants were 
responsible for payment for additional medical treatment, specifically continuing narcotic 
medications and the costs of implantation of a spinal stimulator device. Claimant also sought to 
recover additional income benefits for disability in excess of the impairment benefits previously 
paid. 
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The Commission determined that Claimant was not entitled to recover either additional 
benefits or additional income benefits. the Commission's decision, the 
Defendants have in fact paid significantly more benefits than Claimant was entitled to under her 
workers' compensation claim. 
Claimant appeals from the Commission's decision, asserting that the Commission erred 
m its conclusion that Claimant was not entitled to additional medical benefits. The 
Commission's decision regarding income benefits is not challenged on appeal. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Claimant filed her Workers' Compensation Complaint on February 26, 2010. The 
Complaint (R. p.2) sought payment for past medical expenses, future medical expenses and 
income benefits for permanent partial disability. The Defendants answered Claimant's 
Complaint on March 18, 2010. Defendants' Answer admitted that Claimant's workers' 
compensation claim was compensable and that she had been entitled to the medical benefits, 
temporary disability benefits and the permanent physical impairment benefits that had been 
previously paid. (R. p.5). 
The case was assigned to Referee Douglas Donahue, who conducted a hearing in Idaho 
Falls on August 26, 2014. At the hearing, the exhibits offered by the parties were admitted into 
evidence. (Tr. p. 9). The Referee heard testimony from Claimant Channel Rish (Tr. pp.40-124) 
and from her mother Donna Rish (Tr. pp.17-39). Thereafter, Claimant's attorney took the post-
hearing depositions of Jason Poston MD, Carol Anderson PhD and vocational consultant Kent 
Granat. Defendants took the post-hearing depositions of vocational consultant Mary Barros-
Bailey PhD and Gary Walker MD. 
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After reviewing the evidence, the Referee authored his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Recommendation. (R. pp.10-44). The Referee's Findings and Conclusions were 
adopted by the Commission in its Order deciding the case, entered on September 23, 2015 (R. 
pp.45-46). I 
In the decision, the Referee and the Commission found that Claimant was entitled to 
medical benefits related to her injury up until August 9, 2007, when she was found to have 
reached medical stability and that she was not entitled to medical benefits thereafter. The Referee 
and the Commission further held that Claimant was not entitled to additional temporary 
disability benefits, that she was entitled to permanent physical impairment benefits of 5% of the 
whole person (which had been previously paid) and that she was not entitled to benefits for 
permanent disability in excess of her impairment. (R. pp.45-46). 
On October 29, 2015 Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal (R. pp.47-51). The appeal is 
timely. The Notice of Appeal challenges the Commission's ruling with regard to Claimant's 
entitlement to medical treatment. (R. p.49). Appellant's Opening Brief does not specify what 
relief is being sought from this Court. Presumably, Claimant wants to have the Court remand the 
case to the Commission for reconsideration of the medical issues. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Appellant's Opening Brief provides the Court with little information regarding the factual 
background of this case and the course of Claimant's medical treatment subsequent to her 
industrial accident. Defendants believe that this information is essential to an understanding of 
the Industrial Commission's decision and therefore supply the following discussion. 
1 The Commission's Order was signed by two of the three Commissioners, with Commissioner Thomas Baskin 
having recused himself from the case. Commissioner Baskin had provided legal advice to the Surety's adjuster, 
before he took his position as a Commissioner. 
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Claimant Channel Rish was born on  At the time of the hearing she was 35 
grew up Idaho Falls with both parents and brother. 
Claimant had a troubled adolescence. She was diagnosed with a seizure disorder for which 
she required medication. (Tr. pp.17, 18). She had behavioral problems that became a serious 
concern for her parents. Her mother described her "not fitting in" at school. She was put into an 
alternative school but dropped out. (Tr. p.20). She would run away and on occasion would get in 
trouble with the police. (Tr. pp. I 8, 19). 
The situation led to two in-patient psychiatric hospitalizations. (Tr. p.31 ). The diagnosis 
was depression. (Tr. p.37). 
Claimant did manage to complete high school and she obtained a diploma. She left home at 
age 18 to get married. (Tr. p.20). The marriage lasted about 5 Yz years and produced two children 
who live with Claimant. (Def's Ex. A, Claimant's depo. p.9). 
Claimant's medical history is significant for problems with her right knee. She was treated 
for right knee problems involving pain and swelling with fluid buildup. As a teenager, she was 
examined by her family doctor, who referred to her right knee problems as "chronic" and prescribed 
a brace. (Def's Ex. K p.126). Claimant's medical history is also significant for a prior work injury 
to her right hand, incurred a few months before coming to work for The Home Depot. This led to 
surgery on Claimant's index finger on January 15, 2005 and a lengthy period of recovery during 
which she was taking prescription pain medications. (see Claimant's Ex. 23). 
Claimant's industrial accident at The Home Depot happened more than 10 years ago on 
October 30, 2005. She walked around a counter and slipped on a fatigue mat, injuring her right 
knee. (Tr. p.52). In retrospect, it is easy to see that Claimant's response to this incident was 
immediately and consistently out of proportion to the injury. She was seen at the local emergency 
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room after the accident and the doctor there could not do a complete examination of the knee 
because Claimant's extreme complaints. Because of that, the only diagnosis he could make 
was simply "knee injury." (Ex. 1 p.3). When she followed up with her family doctor, she again 
exhibited pain complaints that were so severe that an examination could not be accomplished. The 
diagnosis was "sprain." The doctor prescribed hydrocodone, an opioid pain medication. 
(Claimant's Ex. 2. p.2). 
Claimant was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Casey Huntsman of Idaho Falls. She 
saw Dr. Huntsman a little more than a week after the accident. At that time her pain complaints 
were still extreme and it made it difficult for Dr. Huntsman to do a complete examination. (see Ex. 
3. pp.1-2). Because he couldn't get a good assessment of what was going on with Claimant's knee 
from the examination, he ordered an MRI. 
The MRI scan was done at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center on November 17, 2005. 
(Ex. 1, p.4). The results were very benign. All of the major structures of the knee were intact and 
normal. The only potential exception to that was that the radiologist could not "absolutely exclude" 
a subtle tear of the medial meniscus. (Ex. 1, p.4). Given these MRI findings Dr. Huntsman was not 
anxious to do surgery. When he saw Claimant in follow-up he advised her on some home exercises 
and asked her to check back with him in four weeks to see how she was doing. (Ex. 3 p.3). 
However, on December 2, 2005 Claimant was back to the emergency room at EIRMC, 
seeking pain medication. (Ex. 1, p.5). After Claimant returned to Dr. Huntsman he authored a 
record reciting that Claimant was continuing to have problems with her knee and that she was 
"strongly soliciting surgical intervention." (Ex. 1 p. l 0). Dr. Huntsman took Claimant to surgery on 
December 14, 2005. He performed an arthroscopic procedure on the knee, looking for a possible 
medial meniscus tear. He did not find one. Dr. Huntsman's operative report discusses his 
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observations at surgery of the principal structures of the knee. These were all in good shape. (Ex. 1 
Unfortunately, Claimant's pain complaints continued and Dr. Huntsman ended up doing two 
additional procedures on Claimant's knee, on August 16, 2006 and again on May 18, 2007 (Ex 5 
pp.2-5). Neither of these surgeries revealed any physiological reason for Claimant's pain 
complaints, nor did they resolve those complaints. During the course of his treatment of Claimant, 
Dr. Huntsman had been prescribing the opioid medication hydrocodone. When Dr. Huntsman saw 
Claimant on June 28, 2007, he noted that he was giving her "the last hydrocodone prescription 
today." (Ex. 3 p.21 ). Claimant responded to this by finding another doctor for her medications. 
In July 2007 Claimant started receiving her medications from a "pain management" 
physician in Idaho Falls, Dr. Holly Zoe. Dr. Zoe treated Claimant with various forms of opioid pain 
medications, primarily Fentanyl and oxycodone. (Ex. 6). These medications did not resolve 
Claimant's pain complaints. 
On August 9, 2007 Claimant saw Dr. Huntsman in follow-up after her last surgery. Dr. 
Huntsman examined Claimant and found that her patella was mobile, there was no swelling, the 
knee was stable and her sensory and motor nerves were intact. He determined that Claimant had 
reached maximum medical improvement with regard to her knee injury. He rated her for permanent 
impairment, finding a 3% whole person permanent physical impairment. (Ex 3 p.23). On August 
30, 2007 Dr. Huntsman addressed permanent work restrictions in correspondence with a vocational 
consultant employed by the Industrial Commission. Dr. Huntsman released Claimant to return to 
her time-of-injury job, noting that "objectively, there are no work restrictions .... " He went on to 
note that subjectively, Claimant continued to complain of pain and that she believed she had 
significant work restrictions. (Def s Ex. C p.51 ). Dr. Huntsman had nothing more to offer Claimant. 
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He noted that she was seeing Dr. Zoe, the pain management doctor and he offered a concurrence in 
that treatment. Probably because that, the Employer and Surety continued to pay for Claimant's 
medical treatment after she had been found medicaliy stable. In fact, the Employer and Surety paid 
for Claimant's palliative medical care for nearly 2 additional years, during which time Claimant 
received continuing prescriptions for narcotic pain medications and various injection therapies, 
which did not improve her condition. ( see Ex. 6). 
By late 2007 Dr. Zoe was suggesting the possibility of a spinal stimulation trial. (Ex. 6 p.8). 
This prompted the Employer and Surety to schedule independent medical examinations with Drs. 
Robert Friedman and Christian Gussner of Idaho Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. They saw 
Claimant on January 9 and 10, 2008, to diagnose her condition and offer treatment 
recommendations. Dr. Gussner felt that Claimant had suffered a simple knee sprain in her industrial 
accident of October 2005. He thought she had chronic knee pain of unclear etiology. He did not 
believe that Claimant was in need of spinal stimulation or other interventional pain therapies. His 
recommendation was that Claimant attend a chronic pain management program offered through 
Idaho Elks Rehabilitation Hospital. The purpose of this would have been to restore Claimant's 
function while getting her off of opioid medications. (Defs Ex. L p.294). Dr. Friedman, who 
examined Claimant separately, made a similar recommendation. He too thought that Claimant 
needed to be detoxified from narcotics. He saw no need for spinal stimulation and no need for any 
further orthopedic intervention. (Ex. L p.296-301). Drs. Gussner and Friedman assessed Claimant's 
permanent physical impairment at 5% of the whole person. (Ex. L p.308). 
Following these IMEs Claimant was offered an opportunity to attend the recommended 
program at the Elks Hospital in Boise. She did not participate in the program. Claimant testified at 
the hearing that this was because the surety refused to pay for her child care. (Tr. p.59). In fact, 
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Claimant sabotaged the effort to have her attend this program by demanding a large advance 
payment of child care expense. The surety refused this demand and Claimant did not attend the 
program. (see Defs Ex. L p.311). 
For an additional year Claimant continued to get her narcotic pain medications, primarily 
Fentanyl and hydrocodone, through Dr. Zoe, at the Defendants' expense. She also had lumbar 
sympathetic injections that were not helpful. (see Ex. 6 pp.33-37). 
In January 2009 Claimant returned to Boise for a panel examination by Dr. Christian 
Gussner and psychologist Michael McClay PhD. Claimant told Dr. Gussner that her knee was no 
better and that her pain was "exactly the same." (Def' s Ex. L p.310). He was unable to detect any 
ongoing problem with Claimant's right knee, nor did he see any evidence of complex regional pain 
syndrome (CRPS), which had been suggested as a possibility by Dr. Zoe. Dr. Gussner thought that 
Claimant had probably strained her knee in the work injury on October 30, 2005 but he noted that 
the subsequent MRI scan three weeks later was essentially normal. Dr. Gussner' s continuing 
recommendation was that Claimant taper and discontinue her opioid medications, which would 
have occurred had she attended the Elks Hospital program. (Def's Ex L pp.310-313). 
The psychologist, Dr. McClay noted Claimant had a long history of personal problems and 
medical problems that led to elements of chronic pain syndrome, depression, anxiety and symptom 
magnification syndrome. Dr. McClay's primary recommendation was that Claimant "needs to be 
out of the workers' compensation process as quickly as possible." (Def's Ex M, p. 318). 
The results of the panel examination were sent to Dr. Zoe. She decided to begin titrating 
down Claimant's narcotic pain medications. When Claimant was informed of this in an appointment 
on May 1, 2009 she reacted (according to Dr. Zoe's records) by becoming very angry and 
screaming at the doctor. This ended their relationship. Claimant was given prescriptions for 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 8 
v"'"''"v'"' and instructions on tapering the use the medication. (Ex. 6 She never 
A v,,,uAA""-" to Zoe. 
The Employer and Surety ceased paying for additional treatment at this point 
Claimant has testified that she was able to discontinue use of narcotic pain medications 
thereafter, for a period of a few months. (Tr. p. l 08). Unfortunately, she relapsed. In September 2009 
he saw her family doctor who gave her a prescription for codeine (Tylenol 3), but she was soon 
back on hydrocodone. (Def's Ex. K p.170). Claimant's family doctor, evidently thinking that there 
was a physical explanation for Claimant's knee pain, referred her for another orthopedic 
examination. 
She saw orthopedic surgeon John Liljenquist MD in July 2010. He had some x-rays done 
that showed no evidence of abnormalities. He thought Claimant might benefit from some exercises 
and maybe anti-inflammatory medications but he ruled out the need for any further surgery. (Ex. 9 
p.4). Dr. Liljinquist, who had no reason to see Claimant again, suggested the "new pain 
management specialist in town," Jason Poston MD. (Id.) By this point, Claimant had burned her 
bridges with Dr. Zoe, the surety had ceased financing Claimant's drug habit and she was getting her 
medications through Medicaid. 
Dr. Poston has been seeing Claimant since September 2, 2010. So far as we know he 
continues to prescribe her medications to this date. Dr. Poston has provided Claimant with 
continuing prescriptions for narcotic pain medications, done a series of lumbar sympathetic blocks 
and had Claimant undergo a neurosurgical procedure for implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. 
None of these interventions have resolved Claimant's pain complaints or led her to become 
more functional. In fact, the reverse has occurred. At the time of the hearing, Claimant was 
significantly less functional than she was before Dr. Poston began treating her. Claimant's 
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deposition was taken in the fall 2010. In her deposition she was asked to describe a typical day. 
was living independently with fiance. She talked about arising at about 6: 15 AM, getting 
the children ready for school, getting them fed and then driving them to school. Thereafter she 
would deal with any errands she might have such as shopping, house cleaning, taking care of things 
outside the home, paying bills etc. Sometimes she would then go to visit with family or friends or 
they would come visit her. She might go for a walk. When the kids got out of school she would go 
pick them up. If the kids stayed at her house she would watch them. Sometimes they would play at a 
friend's house. Sometimes the friends would play at her house. After her fiance got home from 
work she would cook dinner then they would relax for a while, and perhaps watch TV. She would 
then get the kids showered and ready for bedtime. (Def s Ex. A pp.95-100). 
At the time of the hearing in August 2013 Claimant was living with her parents, who were 
essentially taking care of Claimant's children. Claimant testified at the hearing that she now stays up 
most all night tossing and turning because she can't get comfortable (Tr. p.74). When she gets out 
of bed in the morning she takes her medication. She described the effect of the medication. She 
explained "but as soon as I take my medication, it starts kicking in. I feel completely wiped out. I'm 
dizzy." (Tr. 76). Claimant's mother described her condition in testimony at the hearing. Claimant 
seldom leaves the house. (Tr. p. 27). Claimant takes from four to six hot baths a day. (Tr. 25). If she 
is at all active, she ends up "paying for it" by spending the whole next day in an out of the tub. (Tr. 
p.27). 
At the time of the hearing Claimant was on hydrocodone (opioid pain medication), 
gabapentin (for nerve pain), fluroxetine, (an anti-depressant), cyclobenzaprine (muscle relaxant), 
Desipramine (another anti-depressant), Lunesta (for sleep) and Diclofenac (an anti-inflammatory). 
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Dr. Poston apparently has Claimant convincP..<l that her condition is permanent and 
worsen and that she will continue to need his care. She testified: 
"And, you know, he said there is nothing they can really do other 
than to treat it and continue to treat it. It is not going to get better. It 
is going to continuously get worse... They can only manage the 
pain." (Tr. p 6611 10-18). 
During the course of the iitigation, Ciaimant was seen for independent medicai examinations 
arranged by her attorneys. On August 26, 2009 Claimant was seen by Dr. Gary Cook, a retired 
anesthesiologist, in an evaluation arranged by her attorneys. Dr. Cook recommended "no further 
narcotics use." (Ex. 10 p.13). More recently, Claimant was seen by Dr. Brett Bender of Hamilton 
Montana, for an evaluation arranged by her attorneys. Dr. Bender is associated with the Montana 
Spine and Pain Institute. He recommended "strong consideration of a gradual taper of opioid 
medication." He was in favor of Claimant attending a pain management program for that purpose, 
such as the program offered at Montana Spine and Pain Institute. (Ex. 18 pp. I 0, 16). 
Despite these recommendations, at the time of the hearing Claimant was continuing to 
receive her medications through Dr. Poston. (Tr. p.88). Claimant has not pursued any type of rehab 
programs to get her off the medications. (Tr. p.115). She acknowledged that she is less functional 
now than she was before she started treating with Dr. Poston. (Tr. p.113 ). 
It should be mentioned that Claimant had an additional orthopedic examination of her knee 
in October 2013. On October 29, 2013 she saw orthopedic surgeon Jason Dalling MD of Idaho 
Falls. Dr. Dalling reviewed Claimant's diagnostic studies and examined her. He recommended 
some exercises to strengthen Claimant's legs and specifically noted that he was "extremely hesitant" 
to discuss surgical options. (Ex. 3 pp. 29-31 ). 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11 
IL ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard of Review: 
On an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court's review is limited by the Idaho 
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9. That provision limits the Court's jurisdiction. Fife v. 
The Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 513, 260 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2011 ); McAlpin v. Wood River 
Med. Ctr., 129 Idaho 1, 3,921 P.2d 178, 180 (1996); Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. 
Co., 105 Idaho 133, 136, 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1983). 
Accordingly, although the Court exercises free review over questions of law, its review 
of factual findings of the Commission is limited to a determination of whether the Commission's 
factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Warren v. Williams & 
Parsons P.C. CPA 's, 157 Idaho 528,534, 337 P.3d 1257, 1263 (2014) citing Knowlton v. Wood 
River Med. Ctr. 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.2d 36, 41 (2011). "Substantial and competent 
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 
McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 152 Idaho 582, 584-5, 272 P.3d 554, 556-57 (2012). "Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Zapata v. JR. Simplot 
Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). On appeal, the Court does not re-weigh 
the evidence, and "[t]he Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of 
evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous." Knowlton, 151 Idaho at 140, 
254 P .3d at 41. All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed before the Commission. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 975 P.2d at 1180. In this case it is 
the Defendants, as the prevailing parties below, who are entitled to have the facts and inferences 
viewed in the light most favorable to them. 
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The sole issue on appeal is the issue of Claimant's entitlement to additional medical 
treatment after she became 
preponderance of the evidence 
stable. Claimant bore the burden of proving, by a 
Defendants were responsible for the additional treatment 
This required proof that the treatment was reasonable and necessary and proof that the need for 
the treatment was causally related to the industrial accident. Chavez v. Stokes, _Idaho_, 
353 P.3d 414 (2015). A Claimant, who has previously received benefits and is seeking benefits 
for additional medical care allegedly caused by an industrial accident, still has the burden of 
proving that the need for the additional medical care was caused by the accident. Gomez v. Dura 
Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 273 P.3d 569, 573 (2012); Walters v. All Phase Const., 156 
Idaho 259,332 P.3d 992 (2014). 
The essence of this appeal is Claimant's contention that the Commission erred in not 
requiring the Defendants to pay for additional medical treatment. Although Claimant's Brief 
suggests that the Commission misinterpreted recent case authority, the real contention in this 
appeal is a factual one; Claimant believes that the Commission should have found that she was 
entitled to additional treatment. This is a question of fact on which this Court's review is limited 
to a determination of the existence of substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding. Chavez, supra. 
To resolve the medical issue, the Commission and its Referee reviewed and weighed 
conflicting lay and expert evidence, including a variety of medical expert testimony and written 
evidence. This is the function of the Industrial Commission. It acts as a factfinder and is free to 
determine the weight to be given to the testimony of a medical expert. Eacret v. Clearwater 
Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 737, 40 P.3d 91, 95 (2002). "It is the role of the Industrial 
Commission, not this Court, to determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to resolve 
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conflicting interpretations of testimony." Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103. "On 
Court will not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or consider whether it 
would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Lopez v. State, 136 
Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001), quoted in Walters, supra, 156 Idaho at 262, 322 P.3d at 
995. 
B. Some Perspective on Claimant's Condition and Her Claim 
The members of this Court have surely read of the problems caused by recent dramatic 
increases in the usage of prescription opioid pain medications. In May of 2014 a spokesman for 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse, a component of the National Institutes of Health made a 
presentation to a Senate committee, in which it was estimated that between 26.4 million and 36 
million people worldwide, with an estimated 2.1 million people in the United States suffered 
from substance abuse disorders related to prescription opioid pain medications.2 Claimant 
Channel Rish is one of those individuals. She is "habituated" (the doctors don't like the term 
"addicted") to narcotic pain medications. She does not get her narcotics on the street. She gets 
them from a pharmacy with prescriptions authored at her physician's office. The physician who 
now supervises her treatment, Jason Poston M.D. has convinced her that she will not get better 
and will only get worse. (Tr. p. 66). She is convinced that she needs her medications to deal with 
her pain, yet there really isn't a physical explanation for her continuing pain complaints. The 
damage done to Claimant by this "treatment" was apparent from the evidence presented at the 
hearing and was recognized by the Referee and the Commission. (R. pp.37-38). 
This should not be read as suggesting that Claimant is an innocent victim in this 
circumstance. To the contrary, she is aware that the consensus of medical opinion is that she 
2 National Institute on Drug Abuse, America's Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse, 
presented by Nora D. Volkow M.D., May 14, 2014. 
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needs to be weaned from narcotic pam medications. As the Referee and the Commission 
recognized, Claimant has sabotaged attempts to wean the medications. (R. p. 42). In 
fact, when Defendants ceased paying for Claimant's treatment she was able to get off of opioid 
medications, only to later resume taking them. (Tr. p. 108). The Referee and the Commission 
found from a review of all of the evidence that Claimant's continued addiction was not a 
compensable consequence of her knee injury. (R. p. 42). 
So, from the outset, it is important to note that the medical treatment at issue in this 
appeal has not been of any help to Claimant. The Industrial Commission has held that the 
treatment has actually been harmful to Claimant. (R. p. 41, LC. Decision p. 32, para. 128). There 
is no longer any dispute about that. Appellant's Opening Brief now concedes that the treatment 
at issue was harmful. "Claimant does not dispute the Referee's finding expressed at page 32 of 
the Decision, paragraph 128, where the Referee concluded: 
'She suffered, at most, a minor strain. However, extensive medical 
treatment, including three arthroscopic surgeries and several 
injections have produced a harmful result. ... ' " 
(Appellant's Opening Brief pp.2-3). 
It is equally important to note that the treatment in question is treatment that has already 
been received by Claimant, through Medicaid. Claimant is not asserting that she is entitled to 
future treatment, only treatment that has already been received. There is no indication that 
Claimant has any out-of-pocket expenses for this treatment. If we all agree that the treatment 
received was not helpful and this treatment was provided without any direct cost to Claimant, 
then what is it that motivates this appeal? Why is Claimant seeking to hold the Employer and 
Surety responsible for the failed treatment? What difference does it make to her whether the 
Defendants are required to pay for this past treatment through the workers' compensation claim? 
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What does she have to gain? Although the answers to these questions may not be it critical to 
resolving this appeal, it may benefit the Court to understand, in a practical sense, why we are 
here on appeal. The answer can likely be found in this Court's opinion in Neel v. Western 
Construction Inc. 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), and in the way it has been interpreted 
since it was issued. Should Claimant prevail on this appeal, under the authority of the Neel 
decision, she will seek recovery of the medical expenses at "full invoiced rates;" i.e. the rates 
billed by the providers - not the lower rates actually paid by Medicaid. If Defendants are found 
responsible for the treatment, they must make payment to Claimant and her attorneys, not 
directly to the medical providers or to Medicaid. Edmondson v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997). The medical providers, having accepted Medicaid 
payments, are prohibited by federal law from receiving any further payment, even from a 3rd 
party recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (25) (c); 42 C.F.R. § 447.15; Rybicki v. Hartley, 792 F.2d 
260, 261 (1st Cir. 1986); Evanston Hospital v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1993) and Lizer v. 
Eagle Air Med Corp., 308 F.Supp2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2004). Therefore, the Defendants would pay 
"full invoiced rates," but Medicaid would be reimbursed at much lesser rates. The difference 
between the Medicaid reimbursement and the amount actually billed by the providers is then 
available to be split between Claimant and her attomey.3 This is the practical effect of the Neel 
decision and the prospect of this recovery is probably what motivates this appeal. 
C. The Commission Did Not Misinterpret Chavez v. Stokes 
Claimant's brief argues that the Industrial Commission misinterpreted this Court's recent 
opinion in Chavez v. Stokes, supra. In fact, it is Claimant that is misinterpreting the opinion. This 
Court's opinion in Chavez was issued before the Industrial Commission's decision in this case. 
3 In this case the difference between "full invoiced rates" and the amount that would need to be repaid to Medicaid 
may actually exceed $100,000. (see Ex. P). 
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The Referee and the Commission were aware of the Chavez decision; the case is cited in the 
Commission decision. (R. p. 36). As the court will recall, Chavez overruled the earlier 
decision in Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989). 
Sprague dealt with the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment provided under a 
workers' compensation claim. Under the facts of Sprague, the court had used three factors to 
determine the reasonableness of treatment. In a subsequent case, Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet 
and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993) the three factors referred to in Sprague evolved 
into a "test" to be used in approaching the question of whether treatment was reasonable. The 
lesson of the Chavez case was that Sprague 's three factors were not meant to be used as an 
"ironclad test" of reasonableness. Chavez, 353 P.3d at 419. After Chavez the Commission was 
instead to utilize a "totality of the circumstances approach" to a determination of whether 
specific medical treatment was reasonable. The Court cautioned that it was hesitant to provide 
specific factors for utilization in the Commission's fact-finding approach, out of concern that 
those factors might later be interpreted as definitive, as had been done with Sprague. (Id.). 
As noted, the Referee and the Commission recognized the significance of the Chavez 
decision and based its decision regarding Claimant's entitlement to medical treatment on "the 
totality of facts and circumstances .... " (R. p. 38). Simply put, the Commission followed the 
Court's directive announced in Chavez. 
In her argument to this Court, Claimant wants to seize upon some dicta in the Chavez 
decision (from a Justice Bistline dissent in Hipwell) cautioning against "armchair doctoring" 
with the benefit of hindsight. Chavez, 353 P.3d at 419. Claimant would interpret these comments 
as meaning that the Court has adopted a specific rule in Chavez prohibiting any retrospective 
review of whether medical treatment was helpful to a Claimant. Such an interpretation was 
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surely not intended by the Court, as this would conflict with the overall premise that the 
Commission was to able to utilize the totality of the circumstances in evaluating the medical 
treatment. Such an interpretation would also conflict with the Court's reluctance to identify 
specific factors, lest they come to be misinterpreted as hard and fast rules. The Court in Chavez 
surely did not intend to preclude any consideration of the actual result of the treatment in 
question. That wouldn't make sense. 
In some cases, the Commission will be required to make a prospective review of the 
reasonableness of medical treatment. Sometimes, particularly with questioned surgeries, the 
Commission will be called on to address "reasonableness" in advance of the treatment. On other 
occasions the circumstances of the case may dictate that the Commission will have the benefit of 
a retrospective view. Post Chavez it is true that in the right case, medical treatment might be 
considered "reasonable" even though a patient might not make "gradual improvement from the 
treatment." This factor is no longer a hard and fast requirement under a Sprague test. However, 
the result of the treatment, in appropriate cases can and should be considered as part of the 
totality of the circumstances. In some cases, it may be the best evidence of reasonableness. 
To the extent that Claimant would read Chavez as precluding any consideration of the 
result of medical treatment, this would be a misinterpretation. The Commission recognized the 
court's holding in Chavez and applied it, in basing the decision on all facts and circumstances 
relating to the medical treatment in question. 
Moreover, with regard to the contested treatment - continuing narcotics and a spinal 
stimulator implant - it makes no difference in the result whether the analysis is prospective or 
retrospective. Under any approach there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the 
Commission's factual finding that this "treatment" was not reasonable. 
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D. The Commission's Finding on Medical Treatment is Supported by Substantial and 
Competent Evidence. 
At this point, it is probably appropriate to remind the Court that Claimant no longer 
disputes that the treatment in question in this appeal was not helpful to her and was in fact 
"harmful" to her. Claimant is seeking to recover from these Defendants the cost of failed 
treatment that she has already received. The treatment in question is principally continuing 
medication therapies, particularly narcotics and the "big-ticket item" which is the cost of an 
implanted spinal cord stimulator. As discussed above, obviously neither of these therapies have 
been of help to Claimant in restoring her function. So, with the benefit of a retrospective view, 
there's no question at all that the treatment was not reasonable. Apparently, Claimant would 
concede this. (see Claimant's Opening Brief, pp.2-3). 
Rather than arguing that the treatment actually helped Claimant in any objective way, the 
argument is that the Commission should not have even considered the poor results from the 
treatment. As discussed above, Claimant is arguing for a misinterpretation of the Chavez 
decision. But, even if we assume that any retrospective analysis is off-limits, there is more than 
ample support for the finding that the treatment was not reasonable. Before the Employer and 
Surety ceased paying for Claimant's medication therapies in the summer of 2009, at least three 
medical doctors and a psychologist had opined that Claimant was not benefiting from continued 
opioid medications and should be taken off of them. The evidence of this is found in this record 
in the reports of Drs. Christian Gussner and Robert Friedman from January 9th and 10th of 2008, 
(Defs Ex. L), the reports of Dr. Gussner and Dr. McClay from January 2009 (Defs Ex.Land 
M, respectively) and the records of Claimant's treating pain management specialist at the time, 
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Holly Zoe MD (Ex. 6 p.75). The need for Claimant to be off of the narcotics was confirmed by 
IME physician Dr. Gary Cook in August 2009. lOp.13). 
fact, one were to exclude any sort of retrospective analysis, at the time the 
Defendants ceased paying for Claimant's narcotics, there was no physician recommending that 
narcotic therapy be continued. The Commission's finding that it was not unreasonable for the 
Defendants to cease paying for Claimant's medication therapies is more than amply supported by 
the record, regardless of whether one takes a prospective or retrospective view of that decision. 
The same can be said for the Defendants' decision not to pay for the spinal cord 
stimulator implant. On September 4, 2007 Dr. Zoe, who was then treating Claimant, was having 
difficulty explaining Claimant's ongoing pain complaints. Dr. Zoe wrote: "I don't feel that spinal 
cord stimulation will be a success for her mechanical pain, although I am willing to try, but the 
success rate probably will be low." (Ex. 6 p. 12). Drs. Gussner and Friedman both specifically 
recommended against spinal stimulation and other invasive therapies in their reports in January 
2008. (Defs Ex. L). Dr. Gussner again recommended against spinal stimulation in January 2009 
(Id) as did Dr. McClay, who rather forcefully suggested that Claimant would best be served by 
being "out of the workers' compensation process as quickly as possible." (Defs. Ex. M p.318). 
Even if we ignore the fact that the spinal stimulator has not been beneficial, and just take a 
prospective view, the foregoing opinions existed before the device was implanted at Dr. Poston's 
suggestion in January 2011. Again, there is clearly substantial and competent evidence to support 
the Industrial Commission's factual finding that the Defendants did not have a responsibility for 
providing this therapy. 
Claimant's argument for recovery of the costs of the spinal stimulator focuses almost 
exclusively on a single statement made by Dr. Gary Walker in his post-hearing deposition. Dr. 
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Walker's statement needs to be understood in context. He had seen Claimant for an independent 
medical examination and had authored reports supporting Defendants' position with regard to 
narcotic medications and the spinal stimulator. (Exs E & L ). As regards narcotics, he stated "I do 
not see the need for any ongoing medical treatment other than weaning off of her narcotics." (Ex. 
L). When he examined Claimant he found no evidence of CRPS - the condition for which the 
stimulator had supposedly been implanted. (Depo. Dr. Walker p. 10; Ex.Np. 335). In fact, in 
his practice he had never seen spinal stimulation attempted as a remedy for knee pain. (Ex. N p. 
336). He acknowledged that spinal stimulation may have place in treatment of CRPS, but he 
testified that in his practice he has treated hundreds of patients with sports injuries and knee 
related injuries and he had never seen findings of CRPS localized to the knee. (Depo. Dr. Walker 
p. 31). From his review of Claimant's medical records and his examination of her he really 
didn't find any reason for her continuing pain complaints. (Depo. Dr. Walker pp. 9-10). In fact, 
he had opined that continuing narcotic therapies and the spinal stimulator were "not work-
related." (Ex. E). 
During Dr. Walker's post-hearing deposition, he was read a statement from a chart note 
of Dr. Poston in which Dr. Poston had recorded findings consistent with CRPS. He was asked 
whether he had any reason to disagree with Dr. Poston's observations. Dr. Walker indicated that 
he couldn't disagree with Dr. Poston's findings - because he wasn't there. (Depo. Dr. Walker, 
pp. 24-25). Dr. Walker did note that Dr. Poston's findings in regard to CRPS symptoms were 
not consistent in Dr. Poston's records. (Id at p.27) and he had found no such findings in his own 
examination of Claimant. (Id at p.10). When Dr. Walker was asked in his deposition to express 
his opinion as to whether spinal stimulation was reasonable and necessary as a result of 
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Claimant's knee injury, he did show some reluctance to criticize Dr. Poston - and this is the 
source of the one sentence from his testimony that is quoted in Claimant's brief. He testified: 
Q. Do you have any opinions as to whether that treatment [spinal 
stimulation] was reasonable and necessary as a result of the knee 
. . ? lllJUry . ... 
A. Yeah. Yeah. Again, based on what I was seeing at the time I 
saw the patient, I would say no. Based on her response to the 
stimulator and how her pain has not changed, I would say no. 
Based on his [Dr. Poston's] statement on that one note of his exam 
findings and doing a trial and her getting some positive response to 
a trial, it seems at the time it was maybe a reasonable thing to do. 
(Depo. Dr. Walker p. 44 II. 4-11 ). 
This is the statement that becomes the center-piece of Claimant's argument. In the 
briefing Claimant asserts that Dr. Walker "expressly declared during his deposition that Dr. 
Poston's prescribing a spinal cord stimulator was reasonable." (Appellant's Opening Brief p. 
12). Understood in context, that is not true at all. In essence, what Dr. Walker was saying is that 
when one examines all of the facts and circumstances, the treatment was not reasonable, but if 
confined to consideration of only one chart note of Dr. Poston and Claimant's positive report 
following a trial of spinal stimulation, then "maybe" it could be considered reasonable. This 
comment from Dr. Walker probably doesn't even meet the standard for admissibility; i.e., an 
opinion expressed to a reasonable degree of medical probability. However, it is the best that 
Claimant has and so she fashions her argument from it. 
Defendants would offer two additional comments with regard to Claimant's reliance on 
this statement of Dr. Walker. First, Dr. Walker's testimony was taken into account by the 
Referee and the Commission along with all of the other medical evidence. Dr. Walker's 
testimony is discussed at some length in the Commission's decision in paragraphs 81 through 85. 
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(R. pp.28-30). The testimony, which was supportive of the Defendants' position, was 
appropriately considered the Referee and the Commission along with the records and 
testimony of all of the lay and expert witnesses. Claimant's argument attempts to selectively 
extract one sentence, out of context and have this Court reject the Commission's fact-finding 
based on that one comment. This is an invitation that the Court should decline. The clear 
weight of the evidence, including the evidence from Dr. Walker supports the Commission's 
determination that the additional treatment was not reasonable and that the Defendants did not 
have a responsibility for it. 
Finally, there is some irony in Claimant's argument based on the one statement of Dr. 
Walker. Claimant's legal argument seems to be that Commission shouldn't employ a 
retrospective analysis that takes into account the actual effect of the medical treatment. Yet, Dr. 
Walker's statement, on which Claimant wants to rely, is itself a retrospective view (speculation 
really) of what Dr. Poston may have been thinking years earlier. 
The truth is, this never was a close case on the issue of the reasonableness of the medical 
treatment Claimant received after the Defendants ceased paying for her care. The thorough 
review of the evidence performed by the Referee and the Commission resulted in a decision that 
very candidly recognized that the treatment in question was not reasonable, has not been 
beneficial to Claimant and in fact has been harmful to her. The Commission applied the correct 
standard in considering all of the facts and circumstances relating to the treatment in question. 
The factual decisions of the Referee and the Commission are clearly supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. There is no basis for this Court to reverse the Commission's decision with 
regard to these failed therapies. The Commission's decision should be affirmed. 
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E. The Argument Regarding Dr. Burks is a Red Herring 
Claimant's brief contains references to a medical referral for Claimant to see an 
orthopedic surgeon at the University of Utah, a Dr. Burks. The argument seems to be that the 
Defendants unreasonably denied an evaluation by this physician and that this should somehow 
be the basis for an attorney fee award to Claimant (Appellant's Opening Brief p.14). Claimant 
raised the same argument below; i.e., she used the referral to Dr. Burks as the basis for an 
attorney fee claim. However, Claimant didn't ask the Commission to order the Defendants to 
provide an examination by this doctor and she's not asking this Court to do so. After Defendants 
ceased paying for Claimants treatment, she was evaluated by two orthopedic surgeons, but she 
didn't choose to see Dr. Burks. The record really doesn't contain much information about this 
fellow's credentials and why he was thought to be the potential solution for Claimant's problem. 
Evidently, he is a sports medicine physician associated with the University of Utah. We might 
have some additional information about him had there been an actual effort to have Claimant 
seen by that physician. But, that didn't occur and consequently we are left to guess as to what he 
might have added to the situation. 
We do know that Appellant's Opening Brief does not accurately summarize the state of 
the evidence with regard to the referral to this physician. The brief states that "the doctors" 
unanimously agreed on the referral and the Defendants denied the referral without any 
supporting medical advice. (Appellant's Brief pp.9-10). This is incorrect. 
The referral to Dr. Burks originated with Claimant's treating orthopedic surgeon Dr. 
Huntsman. He had done three arthroscopic surgeries and had failed to find any reason for 
Claimant's continuing complaints. On November 29, 2007 he was finished treating Claimant 
and was passing her along when the recommendation was made for a "second opinion." (Ex 3. 
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Actually, this would have been a "third opinion" because Dr. Huntsman had asked his 
orthopedic surgeon Gregory Biddulph MD to assist him with the third and final surgery 
had done on Claimant's knee. (Ex. 5 pp.4-5). Presumably this was to see if Dr. Biddulph 
could find any reason for Claimant's continuing complaints. After that surgery and before 
terminating his involvement with Claimant, Dr. Huntsman authored a chart note on October 4, 
2007 in which he recommended an independent medical evaluation and stated "I definitely do 
not think any more surgery would be beneficial for her." (Ex. 3 p.26). With this 
recommendation, the workers' compensation surety set up independent medical examinations 
with Drs. Gussner and Friedman. When Dr. Gussner saw Claimant, he wrote an initial report that 
concurred with the recommendation for an evaluation by Dr. Burks. (Ex. L). Dr. Friedman 
disagreed with his colleague as to whether such a referral was appropriate. Dr. Friedman 
believed that Claimant had had a thorough workup that had not disclosed any physical problems 
to explain the pain complaints. (Id) The two of them subsequently got together and wrote a 
consensus report in which they agreed that it might be reasonable for Claimant to see this doctor, 
but the need would not have resulted from the industrial injury. (Id). Accordingly, it is 
misleading to suggest or imply that all of the doctors were in favor of the Defendants providing 
the orthopedic referral. 
In any event, the issues as to another orthopedic evaluation are now moot. Since the 
referral to Dr. Burks was recommended, Claimant has gone on to have two additional 
independent orthopedic surgeons evaluate her knee. As discussed above, she was seen by Dr. 
John Liljenquist in July 2010 (Ex 9 pp.1-2) and by Dr. Jason Dalling in October 2013. (Ex. 3 
pp.29-32). Neither of these doctors saw any indications for additional orthopedic surgery and 
neither of them suggested that there would be any benefit to seeing yet another orthopedist. 
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There is no indication that Claimant has made any additional effort to see the University of Utah 
physician. Frankly, when one reviews the course of Claimant's treatment, it is fairly apparent 
that the last thing she needs is to see another orthopedic surgeon. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Referee and to the Industrial Commission sorted through and considered all of the 
lay and expert testimony and other evidence submitted by both the Claimant and the Defendants. 
The Commission applied the appropriate legal analysis, judging the reasonableness of Claimant's 
medical treatment under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. Claimant's evidence simply 
failed to convince the Referee and the Commission that her continuing use of narcotic pain 
medications and the expensive spinal stimulator implant were reasonable therapies for 
Claimant's condition. The reasonableness of the treatment is a question of fact and the 
Commission's resolution of that question is to stand unless this Court should determine that there 
is a lack of substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding. Clearly, 
substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's finding. The thorough 
decision of the Referee and the Commission discusses this evidence in detail. 
These Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of the Industrial 
Commission. 
Respectfully submitted this -Z..~ay of March, 2016. 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
<==:;~~ 
Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety) 
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